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作者：Norman, Thomas W. L.
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：Foster and Young (2003) provide a model of learning by hypothesis testing that spends almost all of the time approximating Nash equilibria of a repeated game. Here I extend this learning model to a macroeconomic setting, where agents' decisions are informed by hypotheses they hold regarding the economy. They periodically test these hypotheses against observed data, and replace them if they fail. Under certain conditions, agents who learn in this way spend a large fraction of the time approxima...
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作者：Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty, and non-bossiness. We show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal welfare loss compared with the average cost pricing rule (Moulin, 1999 and Moulin and Shenker, 2001). (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Ehrhart, Karl-Martin; Ott, Marion; Abele, Susanne
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University System of Ohio; Miami University
摘要：The prevalent term auction fever visualizes that ascending auctions - inconsistent with theory - are likely to provoke higher bids than one-shot auctions. To explore and isolate causes of auction fever experimentally, we design four different strategy-proof auction formats and order these according to expected rising bids based on pseudo-endowment effect arguments (psychological ownership and disparity between willingness to pay and willingness to accept). Observed revenues in the experiment i...
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作者：Kraehmer, Daniel; Strausz, Roland
作者单位：University of Bonn; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We study ex post information rents in sequential screening models where the agent receives private ex ante and ex post information. The principal has to pay ex post information rents for preventing the agent to coordinate lies about his ex ante and ex post information. When the agent's ex ante information is discrete, these rents are positive, whereas they are zero in continuous models. Consequently, full disclosure of ex post information is generally suboptimal. Optimal disclosure rules trade...
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作者：Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：University of Cyprus
摘要：We know that a) two-player symmetric zero-sum games with non-empty equilibrium sets always admit symmetric equilibria and that b) two-player and multiplayer symmetric non-zero-sum games might have only asymmetric equilibria (Fey, 2012). But what about multiplayer symmetric zero-sum games? This paper shows that these games might also have only asymmetric equilibria. One of the examples employed to illustrate this point is the three-candidate version of the popular Hotelling-Downs model of elect...
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作者：Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：In an independent private value auction environment, we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that maximize the agents' residual surplus, that is, the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity. We find that, under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate of type distributions, an optimal deterministic mechanism never extracts any net payments from the agents, that is, it will be budget-balanced. Specifically, optimal mechanisms have a ...
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作者：Rachmilevitch, Shiran
作者单位：University of Haifa
摘要：An IPV 2-bidder second-price auction is preceded by two rounds of bribing: prior to the auction each bidder can try to bribe his rival to depart from the auction, so that he (the briber) will become the sole participant. Bribes are offered sequentially, according to an exogenously given order. Restricting attention to pure strategies (and imposing a certain refinement), I study the efficient equilibria of this game. In any such equilibrium, whenever the first mover offers a strictly positive b...
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作者：Ashlagi, Itai; Fischer, Felix; Kash, Ian A.; Procaccia, Ariel D.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of Cambridge; Microsoft; Microsoft United Kingdom; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：As kidney exchange programs are growing, manipulation by hospitals becomes more of an issue. Assuming that hospitals wish to maximize the number of their own patients who receive a kidney, they may have an incentive to withhold some of their incompatible donor-patient pairs and match them internally, thus harming social welfare. We study mechanisms for two-way exchanges that are strategyproof, i.e., make it a dominant strategy for hospitals to report all their incompatible pairs. We establish ...
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作者：Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung; Wang, Joseph Tao-yi
作者单位：Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology; National Taiwan University
摘要：We design experimental games that capture the logic of Battaglini's (2002) construction of fully revealing equilibrium in multidimensional cheap talk. Two senders transmit information to a receiver over a 2 x 2 state space. Despite overall misaligned interests, full revelation is achieved in equilibrium by having the senders truthfully reveal along distinct dimensions. Our experimental findings confirm that more information can be extracted with two senders in a multidimensional setting. The e...
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作者：Naroditskiy, Victor; Steinberg, Richard
作者单位：University of Southampton; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：It is well known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing; however, payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus, which reduces social welfare. We show that an asymptotically first-best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
