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作者：Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Breitmoser, Yves; Bolle, Friedel
作者单位：University of Nottingham; Humboldt University of Berlin; European University Viadrina Frankfurt Oder
摘要：We study games where voluntary contributions can be adjusted until a steady state is reached. In consent games contributions start low and can be increased; in dissent games contributions start high and can be decreased. The equilibrium prediction is free riding in consent games but as much as social efficiency in dissent games. We test it experimentally and confirm that the dissent mechanism yields substantial welfare improvements over the consent mechanism. With experience, subjects contribu...
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作者：Murto, Pauli; Valimaki, Juuso
作者单位：Aalto University
摘要：We analyze large symmetric auctions with conditionally i.i.d. common values and risk averse bidders. Our main result characterizes the asymptotic equilibrium price distribution for the first- and second-price auctions. As an implication, we show that with constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the second-price auction raises significantly more revenue than the first-price auction. While this ranking seems robust in numerical analysis also outside the CARA specification, we show by counterexam...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; Morgan, Peter
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Tsinghua University; University of Zurich; University of Konstanz; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY
摘要：Social segregation is a ubiquitous feature of human life. People segregate along the lines of income, religion, ethnicity, language, and other characteristics. This study provides the first experimental examination of decentralized matching with search frictions and institutionalized segregation. The findings indicate that, without a segregation institution, high types over-segregate relative to the equilibrium prediction. We observe segregation attempts even when equilibrium suggests that eve...
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作者：Hoffmann, Eric J.; Sabarwal, Tarun
作者单位：University of Kansas
摘要：In Karp et al. (2007), an argument is made to show existence of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in global games that may include both strategic substitutes and complements. This note documents a gap in the proof of that statement. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bogomolnaia, Anna; Moulin, Herve
作者单位：University of Glasgow
摘要：When not all objects are acceptable to all agents, maximizing the number of objects actually assigned is an important design concern. We compute the guaranteed size ratio of the Probabilistic Serial mechanism, i.e., the worst ratio of the actual expected size to the maximal feasible size. It converges decreasingly to 1 - 1/e similar or equal to 63.2% as the maximal size increases. It is the best ratio of any Envy-Free assignment mechanism. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W.
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Cologne; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：In the basic adverse selection model, a seller makes a contract offer to a privately informed buyer. A fundamental hypothesis of incentive theory is that the seller may want to offer a menu of contracts to separate the buyer types. In the good state of nature, total surplus is not different from the symmetric information benchmark, while in the bad state, private information may be welfare-reducing. We have conducted a laboratory experiment with 954 participants to test these hypotheses. While...
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作者：Board, Simon
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
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作者：Diamantoudi, Effrosyni; Miyagawa, Eiichi; Xue, Licun
作者单位：Concordia University - Canada; Kobe University; McGill University
摘要：The two-sided matching literature has focused on static and centralized games. However, in many markets, the matching is determined in decentralized fashion and continues to change. This paper considers infinitely-repeated matching games, where firms whose positions become vacant make offers to workers, who then decide which offers to accept and the game continues. We study how the stationary-equilibrium outcome depends on whether players commit to their employment relationships. We show that,...
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作者：Mackenzie, Andrew
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：A prize is to be awarded, so each candidate designates one of his peers on a ballot. The ballots determine the lottery that selects the winner, and impartiality requires that no candidate's choice of designee impacts his own chance of winning, removing incentives for strategic ballot submission. The primary results are (1) a characterization of all impartial rules that treat agents symmetrically as voters, and (2) a characterization of all impartial rules that treat agents symmetrically as can...
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作者：Abhishek, Vineet; Hajek, Bruce; Williams, Steven R.
作者单位：University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign; University of Illinois System; University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
摘要：DeMarzo et al. (2005) consider auctions in which bids are selected from a completely ordered family of securities whose values are tied to the resource being auctioned. The paper defines a notion of relative steepness of families of securities and shows that a steeper family provides greater expected revenue to the seller. Two assumptions are: the buyers are risk neutral; the random variables through which values and signals of the buyers are realized are affiliated. We show that this revenue ...
