Optimal private good allocation: The case for a balanced budget

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Drexl, Moritz; Kleiner, Andreas
• 署名单位: University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.009
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 169-181
• 关键词: Mechanism design; bilateral trade; Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem; budget balance

摘要

In an independent private value auction environment, we are interested in strategy-proof mechanisms that maximize the agents' residual surplus, that is, the utility derived from the physical allocation minus transfers accruing to an external entity. We find that, under the assumption of an increasing hazard rate of type distributions, an optimal deterministic mechanism never extracts any net payments from the agents, that is, it will be budget-balanced. Specifically, optimal mechanisms have a simple posted price or option form. In the bilateral trade environment, we obtain optimality of posted price mechanisms without any assumption on type distributions. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.