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作者：Chen, Yan; Roughgarden, Tim
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Stanford University
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作者：Kolotilin, Anton
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：A sender chooses ex ante how information will be disclosed ex post. A receiver obtains public information and information disclosed by the sender. Then he takes one of two actions. The sender wishes to maximize the probability that the receiver takes the desired action. The sender optimally discloses only whether the receiver's utility is above a cutoff. I derive necessary and sufficient conditions for the sender's and receiver's welfare to be monotonic in information. In particular, the sende...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir
作者单位：Brown University; Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the group reach a decision by voting whether each premise is true or false, or should they simply vote on the outcome? We show that for any finite number of individuals, the premise-based voting rule is more...
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作者：de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir
作者单位：Brown University; Tel Aviv University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：The paper illustrates how people who need to make a joint decision may have an incentive to withhold information regarding the existence of Pareto improving options. The resulting level of inefficiency varies with the way compromises are reached when the parties have to choose among multiple options. Various reasonable compromise rules can be ranked unequivocally, and a rule resulting in a minimal level of inefficiency is identified. Qualitative results extend to sequential disclosure. Enforci...
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作者：Iossa, Elisabetta; Martimort, David
作者单位：University of Rome Tor Vergata; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University; Paris School of Economics
摘要：An agent gathers information on productivity shocks and accordingly produces on behalf of a principal. Information gathering is imperfect and whether it succeeds or not depends on the agent's effort. Contracting frictions come from the fact that the agent is pessimistic on the issue of information gathering, and there are both moral hazard in information gathering, private information on productivity shocks and moral hazard on operating effort. An optimal menu of linear contracts mixes high-po...
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作者：Toulis, Panos; Parkes, David C.
作者单位：Harvard University; Harvard University
摘要：Kidney exchanges enable transplants when a pair of a patient and an incompatible donor is matched with other similar pairs. In multi-hospital kidney exchanges pairs are pooled from multiple hospitals, and each hospital is able to decide which pairs to report and which to hide and match locally. Modeling the problem as a maximum matching on a random graph, we first establish that the expected benefit from pooling scales as the square-root of the number of pairs in each hospital. We design the x...
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作者：Kim, Sang-Hyun; Choi, Jay Pil
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; UK Research & Innovation (UKRI); Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC); Michigan State University; Yonsei University
摘要：We investigate private and social incentives for standardization to ensure market-wide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. We develop a new methodology to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental conflict of interests between consumers and producers over the standardization decision. Consumers prefer standardization with full compatibility because it offers more variety that confers a better match with their ideal specifications. Howe...
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作者：Dhangwatnotai, Peerapong; Roughgarden, Tim; Yan, Qiqi
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper pursues auctions that are prior-independent. The goal is to design an auction such that, whatever the underlying valuation distribution, its expected revenue is almost as large as that of an optimal auction tailored for that distribution. We propose the prior-independent Single Sample mechanism, which is essentially the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, supplemented with reserve prices chosen at random from participants' bids. We prove that under reasonably general assumptions,...
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作者：Alcalde-Unzu, Jorge; Gomez-Rua, Maria; Molis, Elena
作者单位：Universidad Publica de Navarra; Universidade de Vigo; University of Granada
摘要：The cleaning up of waste present in transboundary rivers, which requires the cooperation of different authorities, is a problematic issue, especially when responsibility for the discharge of the waste is not well-defined. Following Ni and Wang (2007) we assume that a river is a segment divided into several regions from upstream to downstream. We show that when the transfer rate of the waste is unknown, the clean-up cost vector provides useful information for estimating some limits in regard to...
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作者：Filiz-Ozbay, Emel; Lopez-Vargas, Kristian; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：We study multi-object auctions in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either single- or multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that, under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or not. The simultaneous second-price, on the other hand, le...
