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作者：Pan, Jinrui; Webb, Craig S.; Zank, Horst
作者单位：University of Manchester
摘要：Two-Stage Exponential (TSE) discounting, the model developed here, generalises exponential discounting in a parsimonious way. It can be seen as an extension of Quasi-Hyperbolic discounting to continuous time. A TSE discounter has a constant rate of time preference before and after some threshold time; the switch point. If the switch point is expressed in calendar time, TSE discounting captures time consistent behaviour. If it is expressed in waiting time, TSE discounting captures time invarian...
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作者：Garcia-Martinez, Jose A.; Vega-Redondo, Fernando
作者单位：Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：In this paper we propose a stylized model to study how cohesion may affect the spread and consolidation of altruism in a large population where agents are involved in a local public-good contribution game with their neighbors. We show that, if the contribution cost is moderate (neither too high nor too low), cooperation can invade and dominate the population if, and only if, group cohesion displays an intermediate value. This reflects an interesting non-monotonicity of cohesion in the evolutio...
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作者：Panova, Elena
作者单位：Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
摘要：We model expressive voting as a dynamic game with informed and ignorant voters. A voter has selective memory for actions and he is aware of it. We find a unique symmetric equilibrium with ignorant voting. Public signal in favor of one particular alternative creates the bandwagon and underdog effects. When the signal is sufficiently strong, the majority outcome is biased. This is a possible reason for persistence of public policies. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Hart, Sergiu; Mas-Colell, Andreu
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Inspired by the existing work on correlated equilibria and regret-based dynamics in games, we carry out a first exploration of the links between equilibria and dynamics in (exchange) economies. The leading equilibrium concept is Walrasian equilibrium, and the dynamics (specifically, regret-matching dynamics) apply to trading games that fit the economic structure and whose pure Nash equilibria implement the Walrasian outcomes. Interestingly, in the case of quasilinear utilities (or transferable...
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作者：Anderson, Simon; Baik, Alicia; Larson, Nathan
作者单位：University of Virginia; American University
摘要：We study personalized price competition with costly advertising among n quality-cost differentiated firms. Strategies involve mixing over both prices and whether to advertise. In equilibrium, only the top two firms advertise, earning Bertrand-like profits. Welfare losses initially rise then fall with the ad cost, with losses due to excessive advertising and sales by the wrong firm. When firms are symmetric, the symmetric equilibrium yields perverse comparative statics and is unstable. Our key ...
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作者：Babaioff, Moshe; Blumrosen, Liad; Roth, Aaron
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：Online advertising auctions present settings in which there is uncertainty about the number of items for sale. We study mechanisms for selling identical items when the total supply is unknown but is drawn from a known distribution. Items arrive dynamically, and the seller must make immediate allocation and payment decisions with the goal of maximizing social welfare. We devise a simple incentive-compatible mechanism that guarantees some constant fraction of the first-best solution. A surprisin...
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作者：Polonio, Luca; Di Guida, Sibilla; Coricelli, Giorgio
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; University of Trento; University of Southern Denmark; University of Southern California
摘要：We used eye-tracking to measure the dynamic patterns of visual information acquisition in two-player normal-form games. Participants played one-shot games in which either, neither, or only one of the players had a dominant strategy. First, we performed a mixture models cluster analysis to group participants into types according to the pattern of visual information acquisition observed in a single class of games. Then, we predicted agents' choices in different classes of games and observed that...
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作者：Papadimitriou, Christos; Pierrakos, George
摘要：We revisit the problem of designing the profit-maximizing single-item auction, solved by Myerson in his seminal paper for the case in which bidder valuations are independently distributed. We focus on general joint distributions, either discrete or Lipschitz-continuous, seeking the optimal deterministic incentive compatible auction. We give a geometric characterization of the optimal auction, resulting in a duality theorem and an efficient algorithm for finding the optimal deterministic auctio...
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作者：Hedlund, Jonas
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：This paper studies strategic transmission of verifiable information with reporting costs that continuously increase in the precision of the report. Contrary to previous literature, it is shown that the unraveling result first derived by Milgrom (1981) is relatively robust to costly reporting. A separating equilibrium exists even with arbitrarily high reporting costs. Intuitively, the costs work as a signaling device and a combination of disclosure of information and costly signaling accomplish...
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作者：Morrill, Thayer
作者单位：North Carolina State University
摘要：It is impossible for a mechanism to be strategyproof, Pareto efficient, and eliminate justified envy. However, little is known to what extent a strategyproof and efficient mechanism can limit justified envy. We define an assignment to be unjust if a student i is not assigned to a school a that she prefers to her own assignment, i has higher priority at a than some student j who is assigned to a, and none of the students ranked higher at a than i are dependent on j. We prove that Top Trading Cy...
