Bribing in second-price auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rachmilevitch, Shiran
• 署名单位: University of Haifa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.008
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 191-205
• 关键词: Second-price auctions; Bribing; collusion; signaling

摘要

An IPV 2-bidder second-price auction is preceded by two rounds of bribing: prior to the auction each bidder can try to bribe his rival to depart from the auction, so that he (the briber) will become the sole participant. Bribes are offered sequentially, according to an exogenously given order. Restricting attention to pure strategies (and imposing a certain refinement), I study the efficient equilibria of this game. In any such equilibrium, whenever the first mover offers a strictly positive bribe, this bribe is given by his surplus: his valuation minus the payoff that he would have received in the dominant-strategy equilibrium of the auction. I derive a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of such an equilibrium. I also extend this equilibrium's construction to a model with general valuations, not necessarily IPV. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.