Strategy-proof cost sharing under increasing returns: Improvement of the supremal welfare loss

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hashimoto, Kazuhiko; Saitoh, Hiroki
• 署名单位: University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.004
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 101-121
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; cost sharing; increasing returns; Supremal welfare loss; Average cost pricing; Hybrid rule

摘要

We consider a mechanism design problem in economies with increasing returns. We construct a new class of rules, called w-hybrid rules, and characterize them by strategy-proofness, anonymity, envy-freeness, consumer sovereignty, and non-bossiness. We show that w-hybrid rules improve the supremal welfare loss compared with the average cost pricing rule (Moulin, 1999 and Moulin and Shenker, 2001). (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.