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作者：Anwar, Sajid; Zheng, Mingli
作者单位：University of the Sunshine Coast; Shanghai Lixin University of Accounting & Finance; University of Macau
摘要：In an auction-style listing at eBay, sellers have the option to set a posted price (also known as buy-it-now price), which allows buyers to instantly purchase an item before the start of the auction. This paper provides a rationale for such a selling mechanism. When many identical items are offered for sale and there are many buyers, random matching between auctions and the bidders can cause allocative inefficiency. We show that, with the buy-it-now option, some high valuation buyers buy the i...
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作者：Fu, Qiang; Ke, Changxia; Tan, Fangfang
作者单位：National University of Singapore; Queensland University of Technology (QUT); Max Planck Society
摘要：We study the impact of progress feedback on players' performance in multi-contest team tournaments, in which team members' efforts are not directly substitutable. In particular, we employ a real-effort laboratory experiment to understand, in a best-of-three tournament, how players' strategic mindsets change when they compete on a team compared to when they compete individually. Our data corroborate the theoretical predictions for teams: Neither a lead nor a lag in the first component contest a...
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作者：Dughmi, Shaddin; Vondrak, Jan
作者单位：University of Southern California; International Business Machines (IBM); IBM USA
摘要：We address the following fundamental question in the area of incentive-compatible mechanism design: Are truthful-in-expectation mechanisms compatible with polynomial-time approximation? In particular, can polynomial-time truthful-in-expectation mechanisms achieve a near-optimal approximation ratio for combinatorial auctions with submodular valuations? We prove that this is not the case: There is a constant gamma > 0 such that there is no randomized mechanism that is truthful-in-expectation or ...
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作者：Ghosh, Arpita; Roth, Aaron
作者单位：Cornell University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study markets for private data using differential privacy. We consider a setting in which a data analyst wishes to buy information from a population from which he can estimate some statistic. The analyst wishes to obtain an accurate estimate cheaply, while the owners of the private data experience some cost for their loss of privacy. Agents are rational and we wish to design truthful mechanisms. We show that such problems can naturally be viewed and solved as variants of multi-unit procurem...
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作者：Brady, Richard L.; Chambers, Christopher P.
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we introduce a new rule, the geometric median, and characterize it as the smallest rule (with respect to set inclusion) satisfying a collection of axioms. The geometric median is independent of the choice of coordinates and is Nash implementable. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Bradfield, Anthony J.; Kagel, John H.
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study legislative bargaining with two person teams versus individuals. Teams come closer to the predictions of the stationary subgame perfect equilibrium, passing minimum winning coalitions (MWCs) more often and having significantly more proposer power. The increase in proposer power results from increased numbers of MWCs, along with increased proposer power within an MWC. We investigate the driving forces behind teams coming closer to the theoretical predictions. The results favor their gr...
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作者：Shimoji, Makoto; Schweinzer, Paul
作者单位：University of York - UK
摘要：We consider two stories, Typhoon by Conrad and Traveler's Dilemma by Basu (1994, 2007), as implementation problems under incomplete information without incentive compatibility, but where the planner has some private information regarding the state. If social choice functions do not satisfy incentive compatibility, full implementation is unattainable via existing approaches. For each story, we construct a direct mechanism that relies on the planner's private information. We provide a sufficient...
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作者：Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We establish purification results for Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a large class of Bayesian games with finite sets of pure actions. We allow for correlated types and interdependent payoffs and for type-dependent feasible action sets. The latter feature allows us to prove existence and purification results for pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. We give applications to auctions, global games, and voting to illustrate the usefulness of our results. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All righ...
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作者：Parravano, Melanie; Poulsen, Odile
作者单位：University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
摘要：We collect data from symmetric and asymmetric coordination games with a focal point and vary the stake size. The data show that in symmetric games coordination on the label-salient strategy increases with stake size. By contrast, in asymmetric games the coordination rates do not vary with stake size and are close to the levels predicted by both the mixed Nash equilibrium and the level-k model used by Crawford et al. (2008). These findings suggest that players' mode of reasoning, and the extent...
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作者：Yildiz, Muhamet
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Under weak assumptions on the solution concept, I construct an invariant selection across all finite type spaces, in which the types with identical information play the same action. Along the way, I establish an interesting lattice structure for finite type spaces and construct an equilibrium on the space of all finite types. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
