Symmetric zero-sum games with only asymmetric equilibria

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2014.12.001
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 122-125
• 关键词: Symmetric game; symmetric equilibrium; Zero-sum game

摘要

We know that a) two-player symmetric zero-sum games with non-empty equilibrium sets always admit symmetric equilibria and that b) two-player and multiplayer symmetric non-zero-sum games might have only asymmetric equilibria (Fey, 2012). But what about multiplayer symmetric zero-sum games? This paper shows that these games might also have only asymmetric equilibria. One of the examples employed to illustrate this point is the three-candidate version of the popular Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition. This demonstrates that symmetric games with only asymmetric equilibria are not technical paradoxes but are integrated in economics and political science literature for quite a while. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.