Maximizing social welfare in congestion games via redistribution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Naroditskiy, Victor; Steinberg, Richard
• 署名单位: University of Southampton; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.010
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 24-41
• 关键词: Redistribution mechanisms; congestion; VCG

摘要

It is well known that efficient use of congestible resources can be achieved via marginal pricing; however, payments collected from the agents generate a budget surplus, which reduces social welfare. We show that an asymptotically first-best solution in the number of agents can be achieved by the appropriate redistribution of the budget surplus back to the agents. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.