Implementation without incentive compatibility: Two stories with partially informed planners

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Shimoji, Makoto; Schweinzer, Paul
• 署名单位: University of York - UK
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.007
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 258-267
• 关键词: Implementation; rationalizability; incentive compatibility; incomplete information

摘要

We consider two stories, Typhoon by Conrad and Traveler's Dilemma by Basu (1994, 2007), as implementation problems under incomplete information without incentive compatibility, but where the planner has some private information regarding the state. If social choice functions do not satisfy incentive compatibility, full implementation is unattainable via existing approaches. For each story, we construct a direct mechanism that relies on the planner's private information. We provide a sufficient condition on players' beliefs regarding the state under which every player has a unique rationalizable action, namely, telling the truth. Thus, in these stories, the planner's information can bypass the lack of incentive compatibility. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.