Purification of Bayes Nash equilibrium with correlated types and interdependent payoffs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barelli, Paulo; Duggan, John
• 署名单位: University of Rochester; University of Rochester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.08.005
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 1-14
• 关键词: Bayes-Nash equilibrium; purification; undominated strategies; Correlated information; Interdependent payoffs

摘要

We establish purification results for Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a large class of Bayesian games with finite sets of pure actions. We allow for correlated types and interdependent payoffs and for type-dependent feasible action sets. The latter feature allows us to prove existence and purification results for pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. We give applications to auctions, global games, and voting to illustrate the usefulness of our results. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.