Spatial implementation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brady, Richard L.; Chambers, Christopher P.
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California San Diego
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.011
• 发表日期: 2015
• 页码: 200-205
• 关键词: Geometric median; Euclidean preferences; Nash implementation; Maskin monotonicity

摘要

In a spatial model with Euclidean preferences, we introduce a new rule, the geometric median, and characterize it as the smallest rule (with respect to set inclusion) satisfying a collection of axioms. The geometric median is independent of the choice of coordinates and is Nash implementable. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.