Ordinal equivalence of values, Pigou-Dalton transfers and inequality in TU-games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nembua, Chameni C.; Wendji, Miamo C.
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.07.008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 117-133
• 关键词: Cooperative games; Desirability relation; Linear values; Weakly linear games; Pigou-Dalton transfers; Lorenz dominance

摘要

The paper examines the assessment of inequality in TU-games when individual payoffs are modeled using a notion of value. Especially, it studies inequality that affects the payoffs of Linear, Efficient and Symmetric values (LES values). We use the Pigou-Dalton transfers principle and the Lorenz criterion to compare LES values of weakly linear games (Freixas, 2010) and shed light on transfers of payoffs that may result from substituting a given LES value for another. We also characterize weak linearity in terms of Pigou-Dalton transfers. Since such transfers preserve the ordinal equivalence of values, the paper studies the ordinal equivalence of LES values in TU-games. Our study covers four classes of games which are ranked by set inclusion as follows: strongly linear games, linear games, sharply linear games and weakly linear games. We characterize the ordinal equivalence of LES values for each of these subclasses of TU-games. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.