Sanctions in networks: The Most Unkindest Cut of All

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Joshi, Sumit; Mahmud, Ahmed Saber
• 署名单位: George Washington University; Johns Hopkins University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.005
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 44-53
• 关键词: Multilateral sanctions; sender; target; networks; Spanning trees; Cutsets

摘要

The extensive literature on sanctions has mainly focused on a dyadic interaction between sender and target. In contrast, this paper examines sanctions when the sender and target are embedded in a network of linkages to other agents. The sender can assemble a sanctioning coalition of neighbors to sever their links (execute multi-link cuts) to the target and her allies. Efficacy of sanctions is now crucially dependent on the network architecture. We characterize the structural properties of networks in which a sender can effectively sanction a target in the short run (when links can only be deleted) and the long run (when links can be both deleted and added). (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.