Two school systems, one district: What to do when a unified admissions process is impossible

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Manjunath, Vikram; Turhan, Bertan
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.12.004
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 25-40
• 关键词: School choice; deferred acceptance; Decentralized matching

摘要

When groups of schools within a single district run their admission processes independently of one another, the resulting match is often inefficient: many children are left unmatched and seats are left unfilled. We study the problem of re-matching students to take advantage of these empty seats in a context where there are priorities to respect. We propose an iterative way in which each group may independently match and re-match students to its schools. The advantages of this process are that every iteration leads to a Pareto improvement and a reduction in waste while maintaining respect of the priorities. Furthermore, it reaches a non-wasteful match within a finite number of iterations. While iterating may be costly, as it involves asking for inputs from the children, there are significant gains from the first few iterations. We show this analytically for certain stylized problems and computationally for a few others. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.