Fair implementation of diversity in school choice

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bo, Inacio
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.03.003
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 54-63
• 关键词: Mechanism design; matching; school choice; affirmative action; diversity

摘要

Many school districts have objectives regarding how students of different races, ethnicity or religious backgrounds should be distributed across schools. A growing literature in mechanism design is introducing school choice mechanisms that attempt to satisfy those requirements. We show that mechanisms based on the student-proposing deferred acceptance may fail to satisfy those objectives, but that by using instead the school proposing deferred acceptance together with a choice function used by the schools, which incorporates a preference for satisfying them, can optimally approximate the diversity objectives while still satisfying an appropriate fairness criterion. We provide analytical results which show that the proposed mechanism has a general ability to satisfy those objectives, as opposed to some currently proposed mechanisms, which may yield segregated assignments. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.