Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Nunnari, Salvatore; Zapal, Jan
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 275-294
• 关键词: Legislative bargaining; experiments; quantal response; gambler's fallacy

摘要

We investigate the implications of imperfect best response in combination with different assumptions about correct (QRE) or incorrect beliefs (Quantal-Gambler's Fallacy or QGF) - in the alternating offer multilateral bargaining game. We prove that a QRE of this game exists and characterize the unique solution to the proposer's problem that is, the proposal observed most frequently in a QRE. We structurally estimate this model on data from laboratory experiments, and show that it explains behavior better than the model with perfect best response: receivers vote probabilistically; proposers allocate resources mostly within a minimum winning coalition of legislators but do not fully exploit their bargaining power. Incorporating history-dependent beliefs about the future distribution of proposal power into the QRE model (QGF) leads to an even better match with the data, as this model implies slightly lower shares to the proposer, maintaining similar or higher frequencies of minimum winning coalitions and similar voting behavior. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.