Object allocation via deferred-acceptance: Strategy-proofness and comparative statics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ehlers, Lars; Klaus, Bettina
• 署名单位: Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; University of Lausanne
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.001
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 128-146
• 关键词: Indivisible objects allocation; Deferred-acceptance-algorithm; strategy-proofness; Resource-monotonicity; Population-monotonicity

摘要

We study the problem of assigning indivisible and heterogeneous objects to agents. Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We consider mechanisms satisfying a set of basic properties (unavailable-type-invariance, individual-rationality, weak non-wastefulness, or truncation-invariance). In the house allocation problem, deferred-acceptance (DA)-mechanisms allocate objects based on exogenously fixed priorities, over agents. We show that DA-mechanisms are characterized by our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity or (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity. Once we allow for multiple identical copies of objects, on the one hand the first characterization breaks down and there are unstable mechanisms satisfying our basic properties and (i) strategy-proofness and population-monotonicity. On the other hand, our basic properties and (ii) strategy-proofness and resource-monotonicity characterize (the most general) class of DA-mechanisms based on objects' fixed choice functions that are acceptant, monotonic, substitutable, and consistent. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.