Efficient dynamic mechanisms with interdependent valuations

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Wei; Li, Jiangtao
• 署名单位: Chinese University of Hong Kong; National University of Singapore
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.04.008
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 166-173
• 关键词: Dynamic mechanism design; EFFICIENCY; Observable payoff; incentive compatibility; budget balance

摘要

This paper considers a dynamic environment with interdependent valuations and evolving private information. Under the assumption of independent types, we construct an efficient, incentive-compatible mechanism that is also budget-balanced in every period of the game. Our mechanism works in environments where in each period, each agent observes her own realized outcome-decision payoff from the previous period. This extends the insight of Mezzetti (2004) to the dynamic setting. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.