Local incentive compatibility with transfers

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Mishra, Debasis; Pramanik, Anup; Roy, Souvik
• 署名单位: Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; University of Osaka; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.09.009
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 149-165
• 关键词: Local incentive compatibility; Payment-only incentive compatibility; Single peaked type space; Ordinal type space

摘要

We consider locally incentive compatible mechanisms with deterministic allocation rules and transfers with quasilinear utility. We identify a rich class of type spaces, which includes the single peaked type space, where local incentive compatibility does not imply incentive compatibility. Our main result shows that in such type spaces, a mechanism is locally incentive compatible and payment-only incentive compatible if and only if it is incentive compatible. Payment-only incentive compatibility requires that a mechanism that generates the same allocation at two types must have the same payment at those two types. Our result works on a class of ordinal type spaces, which are generated by considering a set of ordinal preferences over alternatives and then considering all non-negative type vectors representing such preferences. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.