Markovian equilibria in dynamic spatial legislative bargaining: Existence with three players

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Zapal, Jan
• 署名单位: Charles University Prague; Czech Academy of Sciences; Economics Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Barcelona School of Economics
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2016.06.013
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 235-242
• 关键词: dynamic decision-making; Endogenous status-quo; Spatial bargaining; Legislative bargaining

摘要

The paper proves, by construction, the existence of Markovian equilibria in a dynamic spatial legislative bargaining model. Three players bargain over one-dimensional policies in an infinite horizon. In each period, a sequential protocol of proposal-making and voting, with random proposer recognitions and a simple majority, produces a policy that becomes the next period's status-quo. An equilibrium exists for any profile of proposer recognition probabilities, any profile of players' ideal policies, and any discount factor. In equilibrium, policies converge to the median's ideal policy, players moderate and propose policies close to the median's ideal in an attempt to constraint future proposers, but the tendency to moderate is a strategic substitute as the opponent of a moderating player does not moderate. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.