Confirmation bias with motivated beliefs

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Charness, Gary; Dave, Chetan
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.02.015
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 1-23
• 关键词: Confirmation bias; Motivated beliefs; Bayesian updating; experiment

摘要

We investigate whether the confirmation bias is mitigated in signal-extraction environments by outside financial interests. We include a background strategic consideration leading to 'motivated beliefs' for people in one role, as they receive higher equilibrium payoffs in a background game in one of two states, while people in the other role receive the same equilibrium payoffs in both. We find systematic differences in beliefs and our results suggest that players with motivated beliefs deviate less from Bayesian updating. However, such players still exhibit a confirmation bias in that they place additional weight on confirming information, in contrast to Bayesians. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.