The procedural egalitarian solution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dietzenbacher, Bas; Borm, Peter; Hendrickx, Ruud
• 署名单位: Tilburg University; Tilburg University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.001
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 179-187
• 关键词: Egalitarianism; Egalitarian procedure; procedural egalitarian solution; Egalitarian stability; Constrained equal awards rule

摘要

In this paper we introduce and analyze the procedural egalitarian solution for transferable utility games. This new concept is based on the result of a coalitional bargaining procedure in which egalitarian considerations play a central role. The procedural egalitarian solution is the first single-valued solution which coincides with the constrained egalitarian solution of Dutta and Ray (1989) on the class of convex games and which exists for any TU-game. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.