Ordinal and cardinal solution concepts for two-sided matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Echenique, Federico; Galichon, Alfred
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; New York University; New York University; Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.10.002
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 63-77
• 关键词: Market design; matching theory; National resident matching program

摘要

We characterize solutions for two-sided matching, both in the transferable- and in the nontransferable-utility frameworks, using a cardinal formulation. Our approach makes the comparison of the matching models with and without transfers particularly transparent. We introduce the concept of a no-trade stable matching to study the role of transfers in matching. A no-trade stable matching is one in which the availability of transfers does not affect the outcome. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.