The impossibility of strategy-proof, Pareto efficient, and individually rational rules for fractional matching

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Alva, Samson; Manjunath, Vikram
• 署名单位: University of Texas System; University of Texas at San Antonio; University of Ottawa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.09.009
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 15-29
• 关键词: Fractional; matching; strategy-proofness; Pareto efficiency; individual rationality

摘要

For a model of fractional matching, interpreted as probabilistic matching, together with the allocation of non-negative amounts of money, we show that strategy-proofness, ex post Pareto efficiency of the matching, and a weak version of ex ante individual rationality are incompatible when each agent's utility is a linear function of both their fractional assignment and money. We identify some avenues to escape this impossibility. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.