Self-rejecting mechanisms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Correia-da-Silva, Joao
• 署名单位: Universidade do Porto; Universidade do Porto
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.006
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 434-457
• 关键词: Optimal punishment; Learning from disagreement; Intuitive criterion; virtual implementation; Self-rejection

摘要

In mechanism design problems where the outside option is a game, a version of the intuitive criterion restricts beliefs formed off-path in case of disagreement, and thus credible punishments for rejecting to participate. However, for virtual implementation, participation constraints can be relaxed by designing beliefs following disagreement using self-rejections: with a small probability that depends on the reported type profile, a mediator rejects the agreement in a way that is indistinguishable from rejection by an agent. Participation constraints can be further relaxed if the mediator makes private recommendations before the outside game is played. Any punishment (by all players except the rejector) such that each player-type is never asked to use an action he does not use in any Bayesian solution of the outside game is a credible punishment. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.