Unraveling over time

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ambuehl, Sandro; Groves, Vivienne
• 署名单位: University of Zurich; Stanford University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.009
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 252-264
• 关键词: Unraveling; two-sided matching; Continuous time game; Law clerks

摘要

Unraveling, the excessively early matching of future workers to employers, leads to hiring decisions based on severely incomplete information. We provide a model of unraveling in a one-to-one matching market without transfers. Its distinguishing feature is the gradual arrival of information about students that occurs over an extended period of time during which matches can be made. In equilibrium, the market spreads thinly over that period and employers' attractiveness to students is uncorrelated with their worker's productivity. Our model connects previous, seemingly unrelated models of unraveling and it highlights the implications of the two-period assumption on which they rely. Our setting permits the analysis of information timing policies. These are effective only if they provide a sudden and sufficiently large surge in information. Our main application is in the market for clerks to U.S. Federal Appellate Courts, a significant input into the efficiency of the justice system. (C) 2020 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.