The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene); Lee, Joosung
• 署名单位: Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.012
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 191-203
• 关键词: Referral network; Referral strategy-proofness; Budget feasibility; core; Shill-proofness; Groupwise collusion-proofness; Referrer's dilemma

摘要

We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, under complete information, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. Under incomplete information, bidders refer truthfully and have no incentive to underbid in GPR. Furthermore, GPR's ex-post revenue outperforms both VCG and SPA, not just in equilibrium but also when bidders do not use weakly dominated strategies.