Characterizing the typewise top-trading-cycles mechanism for multiple-type housing markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Feng, Di; Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
• 署名单位: Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; University of Lausanne; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.010
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 234-254
• 关键词: Multiple-type housing markets; strategy-proofness; Non-bossiness; Self-enforcing pairwise strategy-proofness; Top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism; market design

摘要

We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple -type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top -trading -cycles (tTTC) mechanism. We first show that for lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy -proof, and non -bossy if and only if it is the tTTC mechanism. Second, we obtain a corresponding characterization for separable preferences. We obtain additional characterizations when replacing [strategy-proofness and non -bossiness] with self -enforcing group (or pairwise) strategyproofness. Finally, we show that for strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. Our characterizations of the tTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top -trading -cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple -type housing markets.