Asymmetric auctions: Perturbations, e- equilibrium, and equilibrium

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Dharanan, G. V. A.; Ellis, Alex
• 署名单位: University of New South Wales Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.003
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1-18
• 关键词: Auction theory; Bidding; Nash equilibrium; game theory; Differential equations

摘要

We consider first-price auctions with independent and private valuations that have asymmetric valuation distributions and supports. We first show the existence of equilibrium in these auctions through a perturbation approach, thereby establishing that the limit of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of such perturbed auctions is indeed the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the limit auction with asymmetric supports. We then characterize this BNE and show that the e-equilibrium (e-BNE) of the auction with asymmetric supports is a BNE of close auctions with common supports. We then demonstrate some numerical examples.