Changing collective action: Nudges and team decisions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Diekert, Florian; Eymess, Tillmann
• 署名单位: University of Augsburg; University of Augsburg; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.07.009
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 388-406
• 关键词: collective action; Team decisions; Nudges; Common pool resources

摘要

Nudges are widely used and a broad literature documents that they successfully affect individual behavior. However, in most settings where nudges are needed to change collective action, teams - not individuals - determine outcomes. Because team decision making is pervasive, learning whether nudges work with teams in social dilemmas is important, especially when formal enforcement is difficult. Here, we show that a nudge increases team cooperation by 14 to 16 percentage points in a social dilemma among fishing crews at Lake Victoria, Tanzania. The nudge is particularly effective when team decisions are made by a team member with leadership experience. Our findings are a proof of concept that expands the toolkit of empirical researchers and policy makers that address social dilemmas among teams.