Two experiments on trading information goods in a network

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Kayaba, Yutaka; Maekawa, Jun; Matsushima, Hitoshi
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; University of Tokyo
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.002
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 1-18
• 关键词: Information good; network

摘要

We examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in a network experimentally. A cycle path in a network allows a buyer to become a reseller who can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. A theoretical prediction considers that the price of the information good, even with the first transaction where there is not yet a reseller competing with the original seller, will be lower in networks with a cycle path than otherwise. However, our experiment reveals that the observed price for the first transaction is significantly higher in networks with a cycle path. An additional experiment that enhances competition also does not support the theoretical prediction.