Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; University of Hong Kong
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.008
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 449-459
• 关键词: Least-cost separating equilibrium; Insensitivity to prior; Behavioral diversity; Equilibrium emulation

摘要

We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their signaling actions according to an exogenous distribution. These behavioral agents provide opportunities for strategic low-type agents to successfully emulate higher types in equilibrium, which in turn reduces the cost for strategic high-type agents to separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The model also exhibits a convergence property, which is intuitively more appealing than the least-cost separating equilibrium of the standard setting.