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作者：Ui, Takashi
作者单位：Hitotsubashi University; Kanagawa University
摘要：In games with incomplete and ambiguous information, rational behavior depends not only on fundamental ambiguity (ambiguity about states) but also on strategic ambiguity (ambiguity about others' actions), which further induces hierarchies of ambiguous beliefs. We study the impacts of strategic ambiguity in global games and demonstrate the distinct effects of ambiguous-quality and low-quality information. Ambiguous-quality information makes more players choose an action yielding a constant payof...
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作者：Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip; Ozbilen, Seckin
作者单位：University of Lausanne; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona; Ozyegin University
摘要：We study hedonic coalition formation problems with friend-oriented preferences; that is, each agent has preferences over his coalitions based on a partition of the set of agents, except himself, into friends and enemies such that (E) adding an enemy makes him strictly worse off and (F) adding a friend together with a set of enemies makes him strictly better off. Friend-oriented preferences induce a so-called friendship graph where vertices are agents and directed edges point to friends. We sho...
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作者：Kogan, Shimon; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, Roberto A.
作者单位：Reichman University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen; University of Zurich
摘要：Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing-documented for beliefs about individual outcomes-affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence...
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作者：Lagziel, David; Tsodikovich, Yevgeny
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
摘要：A decision maker (DM) uses an AI agent to estimate an unknown state, for which both possess informative private signals. Conditional on the state and the DM's final assessment, he prefers the AI's recommendations to be incorrect, thus affirming his own superiority or sharing the blame. Our analysis indicates that the correctness of the process is not a monotone function of participants' expertise levels: (i) a less accurate AI may lead to improved outcomes by reducing the DM's reliance on it, ...
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作者：Wakabayashi, Yuya; Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：University of Osaka; Institute of Science Tokyo; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi- object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit- demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is t...
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作者：Salamat, Ramtin
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：When consumers differ in both their valuations and their likelihood of being well-matched with the product, the seller can benefit from offering trial plans as persuasion instruments to the extent of full surplus extraction. In the presence of picky consumers, those skeptical about product quality but willing to pay a premium if the product meets their standards, offering a menu of trials allows the seller to screen consumers and extract more surplus. If consumers with a higher valuation for a...
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作者：Kandel, Emanuel; Mugerman, Yevgeny; Winter, Eyal
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Bar Ilan University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We investigate subjects' decisions to forgo costless information in interactive situations through laboratory experiments utilizing both within-subject and between-subjects designs. We created three strategic environments, each with two games: one environment with games of common interests, one with games of conflicting interests, and a third with one game of each type. In each environment, participants were paired and presented with the two games. They were then asked individually to choose w...
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作者：Chambers, Christopher P.; Turansick, Christopher
作者单位：Georgetown University; Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper uncovers tight bounds on the number of preferences permissible in identified random utility models. We show that as the number of alternatives in a discrete choice model becomes large, the fraction of preferences admissible in an identified model rapidly tends to zero. We propose a novel sufficient condition ensuring identification, which is strictly weaker than some of those existing in the literature. While this sufficient condition reaches our upper bound, an example demonstrates...
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作者：Anderlini, Luca; Samuelson, Larry; Terlizzese, Daniele
作者单位：Georgetown University; University of Naples Federico II; Yale University
摘要：We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportion of cheaters, is sufficiently low. The economy exhibits multiple equilibria. As the proportion of scoundrels in the economy declines, the high-trust equilibrium can be disrupted by arbitrarily small perturbations or by arbitrarily sm...
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作者：Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian; Huck, Steffen; Humphreys, Macartan
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin; Trinity College Dublin; Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive motives with incentives to avoid sanctions by bandwagoning with the winning side. We examine comparative statics in political salience, which we characterize in terms of equilibrium stability as well as attack size. A main insight is that when regime sanctions are weak, increases in salience can pose ...
