Political salience, endogenous bandwagoning, and regime resilience

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian; Huck, Steffen; Humphreys, Macartan
• 署名单位: Humboldt University of Berlin; Trinity College Dublin; Humboldt University of Berlin
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.011
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Political conflict; SALIENCE; DEMOCRACY; SANCTIONS

摘要

We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive motives with incentives to avoid sanctions by bandwagoning with the winning side. We examine comparative statics in political salience, which we characterize in terms of equilibrium stability as well as attack size. A main insight is that when regime sanctions are weak, increases in salience can pose the greatest threat to seemingly safe regimes: ever smaller shocks become sufficient to drastically escalate into full-blown attacks, i.e., the regime becomes less resilient. Stronger regime safeguards not only directly reduce incentives to attack but can overturn these effects, such that increases in salience boost regime resilience. Our results speak to charged debates about democratic resilience, by identifying how safeguards determine when a rise in citizen interest in political action can lead to a threat to democracy.