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作者：Kamphorst, Jurjen; Karamychev, Vladimir A.
作者单位：Erasmus University Rotterdam; Erasmus University Rotterdam - Excl Erasmus MC; Tinbergen Institute
摘要：This paper studies public concern grounds for high prices of drugs treating rare and debilitating diseases. We offer a theory that explains how drug indivisibility, individual budget constraints, and insurance interact to drive up drug prices, especially for drugs treating rare and severe diseases. For a broad range of drug production costs and income distributions, our model predicts that drug prices are either set at their highest levels covered by insurance or inversely related to the preva...
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作者：Gill, David; Knepper, Zachary; Prowse, Victoria; Zhou, Junya
作者单位：Purdue University System; Purdue University; University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas
摘要：We explore the influence of cognitive ability and judgment on strategic behavior in the beauty contest game (where the Nash equilibrium action is zero). Using the level-k model of bounded rationality, cognitive ability and judgment both predict higher level strategic thinking. However, individuals with better judgment choose zero less frequently, and we uncover a novel dynamic mechanism that sheds light on this pattern. Taken together, our results indicate that fluid (i.e., analytical) intelli...
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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：Durham University
摘要：No trade theorems examine conditions under which agents cannot agree to disagree on the value of a security which pays according to some state of nature, thus preventing any mutual agreement to trade. A large literature has examined conditions which imply no trade, such as relaxing the common prior and common knowledge assumptions, as well as allowing for agents who are boundedly rational or ambiguity averse. We contribute to this literature by examining conditions on the private information o...
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作者：Barokas, Guy; Nitzan, Shmuel
作者单位：Ruppin Academic Center; Bar Ilan University
摘要：In his refined characterization of the Borda rule, Maskin (2025; forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy) significantly employs the assumption of a continuum of voters. He concludes by posing an important open question about the possible extension of the characterization result to the case of finitely many voters. This note provides a positive response to this question, based on a novel axiom that conveys the normative appeal of continuity when applied to a discrete setting, namely, th...
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作者：Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：In this paper, I establish the identification and present a nonparametric estimator for the incomplete information generalized second-price auction model. I recover the distribution of the bidders' quality-adjusted valuations from the CDF of the adjusted bids, win outcomes, and click- through rates. Through the Monte Carlo simulations, I evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. Additionally, I compare the estimator of the incomplete information model to the estimator o...
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作者：Song, Jian; Houser, Daniel
作者单位：Oklahoma City University; Chapman University System; Chapman University; George Mason University
摘要：We extend the war of attrition by studying three-period dynamic contest games. In our game, players can either fight against their opponents at the last period or can fight at any period. Waiting is costly. We focus on the role of waiting costs and show that the value of waiting costs is a key factor in determining the type of equilibrium in such dynamic contests. Specifically, when players are allowed to fight only at the last period, as waiting costs increase, contests end earlier, battles a...
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作者：Hagenbach, Jeanne; Jacquemet, Nicolas; Sternal, Philipp
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Paris School of Economics; University of Zurich
摘要：We propose a two-stage experiment in which people receive feedback about their relative intelligence. This feedback is a noisy message reminded at every stage, so that subjects cannot forget this ego-relevant information. Instead, we exogenously vary whether the informativeness of the message is reminded in the second stage. We investigate how this treatment variation affects the informativeness reported by subjects, and their posterior beliefs about their intelligence. We show that subjects r...
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作者：Anwar, Chowdhury Mohammad Sakib; Bruno, Jorge; Foucart, Renaud; Sengupta, Sonali
作者单位：University of Winchester; BPP University; Lancaster University; Queens University Belfast
摘要：We generalize the model of Gallice and Monz & oacute;n (2019) to incorporate a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based on their observation of an incomplete sample of past contributions. We show that full cooperation between and within groups is possible with self-interested players on a fixed horizon. Position uncertainty implies the existence of an equilibrium where group...
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作者：Chen, Yurong; Deng, Xiaotie; Li, Yuhao
作者单位：Peking University; Columbia University
摘要：Stackelberg equilibrium describes the optimal strategies of a player, when she (the leader) first credibly commits to a strategy. Her opponent (the follower) will best respond to her commitment. To compute the optimal commitment, a leader must learn enough follower's payoff information. The follower can then potentially provide fake information, to induce a different final game outcome that benefits him more than when he truthfully behaves. We study such follower's manipulation in extensive-fo...
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作者：Chan, Nathan W.; van den Nouweland, Anne
作者单位：University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst; University of Oregon
摘要：We extend ratio equilibrium to local public good economies by defining Local Public Good Equilibrium (LPGE). We employ share functions for individual agents that allow easy comparisons of consumption utility, both across consumption bundles and across jurisdiction memberships. Share functions furthermore aggregate for parsimonious calculation of equilibrium public good provision within each potential jurisdiction, allowing us to establish a link with hedonic games and deploy results from that ...
