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作者：Berman, Ron; Heller, Yuval
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We study interactions with uncertainty about demand sensitivity that is estimated by analytics algorithms. In our solution concept (1) firms choose seemingly optimal strategies based on estimates from possibly biased analytics algorithms, and (2) the levels of biases form best replies to one another. In equilibrium the firms' algorithms overestimate advertising effectiveness, as observed empirically, which causes advertisers to overspend. In price competitions firms also underestimate price el...
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作者：Cheung, Paul H. Y.; Ellis, Keaton
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Dallas; Monash University
摘要：Recent evidence suggests that non-isolation behavior could significantly impact laboratory experiments using the random problem selection (RPS) payment mechanism through lottery integration. Theoretical work also highlights social preferences that can violate statewise monotonicity, a necessary and sufficient condition for incentive compatibility with the RPS payment mechanism in case of lottery integration. Additionally, non-isolation can influence decisions through non-consequential dynamic ...
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作者：Whitmeyer, Mark
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe
摘要：A natural way of quantifying the amount of information in decision problems yields a globally concave value for information. Another (in contrast, adversarial) way almost never does.
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作者：Protopappas, Konstantinos; Rietzke, David
作者单位：University of Innsbruck; Lancaster University
摘要：We study the optimal design of an innovation contest where a buyer seeks product variety and faces a moral hazard problem. The suppliers are specialized and may differ in their flexibility to adopt approaches outside their areas of expertise. If the specializations are sufficiently different and suppliers are otherwise symmetric, the buyer attains the first-best with a fixed-prize contest (FPC). If one supplier is inherently advantaged or the specializations are sufficiently close, the first-b...
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作者：Ozerturk, Saltuk; Yildirim, Huseyin
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Duke University
摘要：We examine team incentives in environments with positive spillovers and rewards based on ex-post public credit for collective success. Compared to the ex-ante efficient credit allocation that maximizes the team's overall payoff, ex-post credit distorts individual incentives: higher-ability or lower-cost agents receive excessive credit and overexert effort when spillovers are low, but are under-credited and insufficiently motivated when spillovers are high. To address these inefficiencies, orga...
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作者：Jang, Inkee; Ju, Biung-Ghi
作者单位：Hanyang University; Seoul National University (SNU)
摘要：We examine resource allocation in the context of the capability approach with multi-dimensional human functioning outputs. We aim to provide an egalitarian foundation for human development indices (HDIs) using Parfit's (1997) priority principle, which says that when a person becomes more disabled, ceteris paribus, he should receive more resources. An HDI-egalitarian rule allocates resources in such a way that all individuals attain an equal HDI-index value. Using the priority principle or its ...
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作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：Children and adolescents from 8 to 16 years old play the centipede game in the laboratory, where non-equilibrium behavior (passing) can occur for two reasons: an inability to backward induct (cognitive limitation) or a decision to best respond to the empirical risk and take a measured chance (behavioral sophistication). We find that logical abilities develop gradually. While young participants are (as expected) least likely to perform backward induction, those who do, tend to over-estimate the...
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作者：Myatt, David P.
作者单位：University of London; London Business School
摘要：In a war of attrition a player's perceived strength is the distribution describing beliefs about her valuation. Small asymmetries in strength have a large effect: in the unique equilibrium of a game with a deadline the war ends quickly (instantly, as the deadline becomes infinite) with a concession by the (perceived) weaker player. The ranking of strength compares hazard rates in the upper tails of the distributions of beliefs; greater uncertainty about a player tends to give her more strength...
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作者：Tan, Zhibin; Zhigang, Cao; Zou, Zhengxing
作者单位：Beijing Jiaotong University; Beijing Jiaotong University
摘要：We conduct a comparative static analysis for the cores of minimum-cost-spanning-tree games. We introduce a new category of cover, termed as the matrix-exact cover. Our investigation underscores the pivotal role played by the matrix-exact cover, in conjunction with the classical irreducible cost matrix. (i) When edge costs experience a decrease, the core remains invariant as long as the costs of all edges are weakly above their respective matrix-exact covers. (ii) When the costs of certain edge...
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作者：Yang, Jiaqi
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper proposes a model that parsimoniously captures evidence on status quo bias, the reference effect and choice overload. Choice overload is behaviorally defined as an increase in intensity of status quo bias when the menu enlarges. Our decision maker follows a two-step procedure by first limiting consideration to the alternatives that weakly dominate the status quo according to a menu-dependent list of attributes, and then maximizing preference over this subset with tie breaking in favo...
