Self-serving biases in beliefs about collective outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kogan, Shimon; Schneider, Florian H.; Weber, Roberto A.
• 署名单位: Reichman University; University of Pennsylvania; University of Copenhagen; University of Copenhagen; University of Zurich
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.008
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 315-344
• 关键词: beliefs; Bayes' rule; Motivated reasoning; Anticipatory utility; overconfidence

摘要

Beliefs about collective outcomes play an important role in many contexts. We study biases in the formation of such beliefs. Specifically, we investigate whether self-serving biases in information processing-documented for beliefs about individual outcomes-affect beliefs about collective outcomes. In a first study, we find that people indeed exhibit self-serving biases for collective outcomes, and that such biases are similar to biases for individual outcomes. We also observe that the presence of a market institution for aggregating private information produces, if anything, slightly greater collective self-delusion. In a second study, we investigate the mechanisms driving collective self-delusion and find that anticipatory utility plays a large role, rather than ego-utility considerations.