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作者：Dilme, Francesc
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Cho and Kreps (1987) proposed a series of criteria for selecting equilibria in signaling games. Their procedure for applying each criterion was to identify all implausible sender types associated with a given off-path message, then look for sequential equilibria assigning probability zero to every implausible type. This paper provides a systematic study of iterated applications of Cho and Kreps (1987) criteria-where in each round, one excludes the additional types that become implausible becau...
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作者：Anderson, Axel; Pkhakadze, Nikoloz
作者单位：Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
摘要：We introduce an equilibrium model of polarizing communication between a sender and two receivers. The sender's payoff is a function of the receivers' beliefs on a binary payoff relevant variable. All agents share a common prior about this variable. But we assume disagreement about a second binary variable, which enters no utility functions. We characterize the joint distribution of receiver posterior beliefs on the payoff relevant variable that can be implemented. An immediate consequence of t...
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作者：Bos, Olivier; Pollrich, Martin
作者单位：Universite Paris Saclay
摘要：We study optimal auctions in a symmetric private values setting, where bidders have signaling concerns: they care about winning the object and a receiver's inference about their type. Signaling concerns arise in various economic situations such as takeover bidding, charity auctions, procurement and art auctions. We show that auction revenue can be decomposed into the standard revenue from the respective auction without signaling concern, and a signaling component. The latter is the bidders' ex...
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作者：Chatterji, Shurojit; Masso, Jordi; Serizawa, Shigehiro
作者单位：Singapore Management University; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Osaka
摘要：We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the enti...
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作者：Roy, Jaideep; Saha, Bibhas
作者单位：University of Bath; Durham University
摘要：When artificial intelligence (AI) displaces lower-skilled workers with higher intensity, electoral democracies may slow down automation in fear of unemployment and voter resentment. Using a Downsian model of elections where parties promise to limit automation and redistribute automation surplus, we show that when automation is highly productive democracies implement maximum automation, making all workers vulnerable to redundancy and distribute the entire surplus among the working population. M...
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作者：Grabiszewski, Konrad; Horenstein, Alex
作者单位：Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; Qatar Foundation (QF); HEC Paris in Qatar; University of Miami
摘要：Dealing with a problem consists of understanding and solving. While there is vast literature analyzing problem solving, this article focuses on understanding. The problems subjects deal with are finite dynamic games with complete and perfect information. Understanding involves comprehending the relationships between choices and their consequences. The same backward- induction problem is presented using two distinct representations: tree and non-tree. The crucial difference between them is that...
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作者：Cheng, Xiaoyu
作者单位：State University System of Florida; Florida State University
摘要：Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous informa...
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作者：Gudmundsson, Jens; Hougaard, Jens Leth; Moreno-Ternero, Juan D.; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：University of Copenhagen; Universidad Pablo de Olavide; Copenhagen Business School
摘要：We study sequential processes where agents create value through costly and uncertain investments, with success triggering further investment decisions by others. Our paper focuses on designing optimal allocation rules that distribute the total value generated among agents, balancing the recognition of past contributions with incentives for future investments. We prove the existence of equilibrium in the game induced by any such rule and identify a unique investment profile that maximizes the o...
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作者：Deng, Xiaotie; Gafni, Yotam; Lavi, Ron; Lin, Tao; Ling, Hongyi
作者单位：Peking University; Weizmann Institute of Science; University of Bath; Harvard University; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich
摘要：We study competition among multiple contest designers in a general model. The goal of each contest designer is to maximize the sum of efforts of the contestants participating in their contest. Assuming symmetric contestants, our main result shows that the optimal contests in the monopolistic setting (i.e., those that maximize the sum of efforts in a model with a single contest designer) form an equilibrium in the model with competition. Under a very natural assumption, these contests are domin...
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作者：Anderson, Robert M.; Duanmu, Haosui
作者单位：Harbin Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Richter and Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including...
