A general characterization of the minimum price Walrasian rule with reserve prices

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Wakabayashi, Yuya; Sakai, Ryosuke; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; Institute of Science Tokyo; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.011
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 1-26
• 关键词: Multi-object allocation problem; strategy-proofness; EFFICIENCY; Minimum price Walrasian rule; Non-quasi-linear preference; heterogeneous objects; reserve prices

摘要

We consider economies consisting of arbitrary numbers of agents and objects, and study the multi- object allocation problem with monetary transfers. Each agent obtains at most one object (unit- demand), and has non-quasi-linear preferences, which accommodate income effects or nonlinear borrowing costs. The seller may derive benefit from objects. We show that on the non-quasi-linear domain, the minimum price Walrasian rule in which reserve prices are equal to the benefit the seller derives is the only rule satisfying four desirable properties; efficiency, individual rationality for the buyers, no-subsidy, and strategy-proofness. Moreover, we characterize the minimum price Walrasian rule by efficiency, overall individual rationality, and strategy-proofness.