-
作者：Manocha, Kriti; Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Iowa State University
摘要：This paper studies a multi-period college admissions problem where schools' choice rules incorporate affirmative action constraints. Students have the option to either finalize their assignments at the end of each period or participate in subsequent periods with the possibility of updating their rank-ordered lists (ROLs). We show that a gradual matching mechanism makes active students weakly better off (i.e. satisfies monotonicity) if and only if their ROL update rule meets a mild regularity c...
-
作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Khan, Abhimanyu
作者单位：Tilburg University
摘要：We propose a decision-theoretic and cognitive-hierarchy based notion of network stability by examining the decision-making nodes' incentives to change the structure of a network by establishing/dissolving links in between them. While evaluating the desirability of initiating such changes, each node internalizes, to the extent of its limited foresight, the effect of further changes that may be induced thereafter. The nodes may exhibit heterogeneity in their level of foresight, and coalitions of...
-
作者：Bouacida, Elias; Foucart, Renaud
作者单位：Universite Paris-VIII; Lancaster University
摘要：We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the outcome of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with an identical success rate, but without explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, particularly when compared to procedures reminiscent...
-
作者：Rubanov, Oleg
作者单位：Nazarbayev University
摘要：I construct an equilibrium in a cheap talk game with multiple senders that converges to full revelation exponentially fast as the number of senders increases. The senders' biases can be relatively large (comparable to the size of the state space) and have any signs. The equilibrium is robust to replacement noise and exists even if the senders can send only two types of messages.
-
作者：Luo, Zhaotian; Rozenas, Arturas
作者单位：University of Chicago; New York University
摘要：We study how the speaker acquires information when they can misrepresent it in communication with the audience. In a binary action setup, we characterize the speaker's optimal information design and the parametric conditions under which the acquired information is disclosed truthfully. When the players' preferences are sufficiently misaligned, the speaker uses the same information structure as when they could not lie, and they communicate that information truthfully. By contrast, when the play...
-
作者：Rostek, Marzena; Yoder, Nathan
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University System of Georgia; University of Georgia
摘要：The literature has shown that complementarity places significant structure on outcomes in matching markets and exchange economies. We examine the extent to which this structure, and the economic intuition underlying it, is common across these classes of environments. We show that transferable utility matching markets can be represented as exchange economies in a way that preserves competitive equilibria and gross complementarity. Unlike canonical representations that preserve substitutability,...
-
作者：Morita, Kimiyuki; Muramoto, Akitoshi; Sogo, Takeharu
作者单位：University of Osaka; SKEMA Business School; Universite Cote d'Azur
摘要：We study a moral hazard model where multiple agents exhibit interpersonal projection bias, perceiving their peers' production states as similar to their own. Each agent's production state is private information. We characterize optimal contracts with limited liability that induce effort from agents in a production state better than a given cutoff. When the cutoff is sufficiently low (high), relative (resp. joint) performance evaluation is optimal if individual outcomes are contractible despite...
-
作者：Mukherjee, Sayan; Roy, Souvik
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata
摘要：We introduce the notion of regularized Bayesian best response (RBBR) learning dynamic in heterogeneous population games. We obtain such a dynamic via perturbation by an arbitrary lower semicontinuous, strongly convex regularizer in Bayesian population games with finitely many strategies. We provide a sufficient condition for the existence of rest points of the RBBR learning dynamic, and hence the existence of regularized Bayesian equilibrium in Bayesian population games. These equilibria are s...
-
作者：Szwagrzak, Karol Flores-; Osterdal, Lars Peter
作者单位：Copenhagen Business School
摘要：A partnership can yield a return-a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different...
-
作者：Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios
作者单位：Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; University of Cyprus; University of Cyprus
摘要：We study electoral competition between two win-motivated candidates, considering that voters care both about the valence and the ideological consistency of the competing candidates. When valence asymmetries are not too large we find a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which (i) platform polarization (i.e. the distance between the candidates' policy proposals) is solely determined by the strength of preferences for consistency, and (ii) the expected policy outcome may move to the right a...
