Rituals of reason: Experimental evidence on the social acceptability of lotteries in allocation problems

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bouacida, Elias; Foucart, Renaud
• 署名单位: Universite Paris-VIII; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.04.001
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 23-36
• 关键词: lotteries; mechanism design; Allocation problems; Procedures; Tie-breaking rule; social choice

摘要

We study collective preferences towards the use of random procedures in allocation mechanisms. We report the results of two experiments in which subjects choose a procedure to allocate a reward to half of them. The first possibility is an explicitly random device: the outcome of a lottery. The second is an equally unpredictable procedure with an identical success rate, but without explicit randomization. We identify an aversion to lotteries, particularly when compared to procedures reminiscent of meritocratic ones. In line with the literature, we also find evidence of a preference for control in most procedures.