Asymptotic full revelation in cheap talk with many senders
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Rubanov, Oleg
署名单位：
Nazarbayev University
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.005
发表日期：
2025
页码：
191-196
关键词：
摘要：
I construct an equilibrium in a cheap talk game with multiple senders that converges to full revelation exponentially fast as the number of senders increases. The senders' biases can be relatively large (comparable to the size of the state space) and have any signs. The equilibrium is robust to replacement noise and exists even if the senders can send only two types of messages.
来源URL：