Rationalizing sharing rules

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Szwagrzak, Karol Flores-; Osterdal, Lars Peter
• 署名单位: Copenhagen Business School
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.018
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Sharing; Consistency; axioms; Welfare maximization

摘要

A partnership can yield a return-a loss or a profit relative to the partners' investments. How should the partners share the return? We identify the sharing rules satisfying classical properties (symmetry, consistency, and continuity) and avoiding arbitrary bounds on a partner's share. We show that any such rule can be rationalized in the sense that its recommendations are aligned with those maximizing a separable welfare function. Among these rules, we characterize those formalizing different notions of proportionality and, in particular, a convenient subclass specified by a single inequality aversion parameter. We also explore when a rule can be rationalized by more general welfare function. Our central results extend to a wider class of resource allocation problems.