Ideological consistency and valence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aragones, Enriqueta; Xefteris, Dimitrios
• 署名单位: Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Barcelona School of Economics; University of Cyprus; University of Cyprus
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.12.004
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 160-182
• 关键词: Valence; ideology; Consistency; Flip-flopping; Electoral competition; Mixed equilibrium

摘要

We study electoral competition between two win-motivated candidates, considering that voters care both about the valence and the ideological consistency of the competing candidates. When valence asymmetries are not too large we find a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in which (i) platform polarization (i.e. the distance between the candidates' policy proposals) is solely determined by the strength of preferences for consistency, and (ii) the expected policy outcome may move to the right as the valence of the leftist candidate increases. When valence differences are large, a mixed equilibrium emerges: the high-valence left-wing candidate chooses a moderate right policy and the low-valence right-wing candidate responds, usually, with an extreme right position and, occasionally, with a moderate left one. Our analysis provides novel insights regarding candidates' flip-flopping incentives, and parties' motives to nominate low-quality candidates.