On strategy-proofness and the salience of single-peakedness in a private goods allotment problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterji, Shurojit; Masso, Jordi; Serizawa, Shigehiro
• 署名单位: Singapore Management University; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Osaka
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.11.017
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 48-70
• 关键词: Strategy-proofness; Multi-dimensional single-peakedness

摘要

We consider strategy-proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles in a set up where multiple private goods have to be assigned to a set of agents with entitlements and where preferences display satiation. We show that if the rule is in addition tops-only, same-sided and individually rational with respect to the entitlements, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single-peakedness (referred to as multi-dimensional single-peakedness relative to the entitlements). We also provide a converse of this main finding. It turns out that this domain coincides with the one already identified in a general set up with public goods. We relate the domain of multi-dimensional single-peaked preferences relative to the entitlements to well-known restricted domains with private goods under which non-trivial and strategy-proof rules do exist.