Ambiguous persuasion: An ex-ante formulation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cheng, Xiaoyu
• 署名单位: State University System of Florida; Florida State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.017
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: Bayesian persuasion; ambiguity aversion; maxmin expected utility; uncertainty averse preferences; dynamic consistency

摘要

Consider a persuasion game where both the sender and receiver are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (MEU) preferences and the sender can choose an ambiguous information structure. This paper analyzes the game in an ex-ante formulation: the sender first commits to an information structure, and then the receiver best responds by choosing an ex-ante message-contingent action plan. Under this formulation, I show it is never strictly beneficial for the sender to use an ambiguous information structure as opposed to a standard unambiguous one. This result is robust to (i) the players having heterogeneous beliefs over the states, and/or (ii) the receiver having non-MEU, uncertainty-averse preferences. However, it is not robust to the sender having non-MEU preferences.