Equilibrium and social norms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anderson, Robert M.; Duanmu, Haosui
• 署名单位: Harbin Institute of Technology; University of California System; University of California Berkeley
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.08.014
• 发表日期: 2025
• 页码: 119-128
• 关键词: social norms; general equilibrium; externalities; Intransitive preferences; Infinite set of agents; Envy-freeness

摘要

Richter and Rubinstein (2020) developed a novel model for social norms, which play an essential role in governing individual behavior in many economic situations. We present a generalization of the Richter-Rubinstein model allowing for an infinite agent space, individualized sets of alternatives, externalities, and intransitive preferences. In addition, we study social welfare properties of feasible Pareto efficient profiles and illustrate the applicability of our results in examples including a centrally planned economy, the classical Walrasian exchange economy, and the formation of social norms.