Data provision to an informed seller
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ichihashi, Shota; Smolin, Alex
署名单位：
Queens University - Canada; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics
刊物名称：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
ISSN/ISSBN：
0899-8256
DOI：
10.1016/j.geb.2025.06.002
发表日期：
2025
页码：
131-144
关键词：
摘要：
A monopoly seller is privately and imperfectly informed about the buyer's value of the product. A designer can provide the seller with additional information, which the seller uses to price discriminate the buyer. We demonstrate the difficulty of screening the seller's information: When the buyer's value is binary, no combination of buyer surplus and seller profit can be implemented other than those achieved by providing the same information to all seller types. We use the result to characterize the set of implementable welfare outcomes and demonstrate the trade-off between buyer surplus and efficiency.
来源URL：